Verified Voting Logo
Edit Your PreferencesContact VerifiedVoting.orgAbout VerifiedVoting.org
Verified Voting HomeJoin - Help us do this work!Donate - Help us do this work!Take Action Today!Endorse the resolution!
Printer Friendly Version
Site Map

See information for:

VerifiedVoting.org engages in lobbying activities permitted by IRC Section 501(c)(4). Please visit the Verified Voting Foundation for info about 501(c)(3) educational activities. You can also visit Vote Trust USA, a project of the Verified Voting Foundation.

E-Mail This Page

Home   »  Take Action  »  Resources  »  Voting Technology  »  Voting Technology: Full ...  »  ES&S iVotronic


ES&S iVotronic

Full Information Sheet




Election Systems & Software — iVotronic

Name / Model: iVotronic[1]
Vendor: Election Systems & Software, Inc. (ES&S)

Federally-Qualified Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail Capability:
None.[2]

Brief Description:
ES&S' iVotronic Touch Screen Voting System is a poll worker-activated, portable, multilingual touchscreen system that records votes on internal flash memory.  A poll worker uses a device called a Personal Electronic Ballot (PEB; pictured above at left) to turn the machine on and enable voting.  Voters choose their ballot language and then make their selections using a touchscreen, much in the same way that modern ATMs work.  When the polls close, poll workers move summary data from each machine onto the PEB.  The PEBs are then transported to election headquarters or their contents transmitted via a computer network.

Detailed Voting Process:
When the voter enters the polling place, a poll worker first confirms the voter is registered.  Then the poll worker walks with the voter to an iVotronic and inserts the PEB in the PEB slot (visible as the rectangular slot in the upper left corner of the middle image above).  The PEB communicates with the iVotronic using infrared signals, much like a TV remote control works, except that the PEB and iVotronic will not communicate unless the PEB is completely inserted.  If the election requires a a specific ballot style, the poll worker chooses this for the voter.  Activation by the PEB enables the iVotronic to vote once.

The voter then selects a ballot language and makes decisions using the touchscreen.  When the voter is done, he or she presses a small “vote” button at the very top of the iVotronic to cast the vote.  The vote is then recorded to three internal flash memories that reside inside the machine.  A fourth memory is a removable card,  called a “compact flash” (CF) card; note that CF is the same technology used in many digital cameras to store photos. During the election, the CF card holds audio files (for those with visual disabilities) and ballot definitions; vote data is written to the CF card when the machine is closed.

A poll worker closes the polls by using the PEB with a password to enter a supervisor menu on each iVotronic.  After closing the election for a given machine, summary vote data are transmitted to the PEB via infrared signals.[1]  After the PEB is used to close all the iVotronic machines, it contains all the summary data for the precinct.  Depending on local regulations and procedures, poll workers can use a “printer pack” at this point to print the result summary from the PEB on to paper.  The PEB for that precinct, any printouts and the CF cards are then either physically transported to a central tabulation facility, and in addition, the data may be transmitted by telephone using the modem included in the printer pack.

All of the electronic ballot images and event log data remain in the iVotronic until it is cleared for the next election.  Many jurisdictions use the serial port on the back of the iVotronic to extract this data for archival storage during normal post-election procedures.  This data duplicates what is stored on the compact flash card, and some jurisdictions save only this data or only the data from the compact flash card.

Past Problems:
  • January 2004: Florida.  In a special election for the State House District 91 seat, with only one item on the ballot, ES&S electronic voting machines showed a total of 134 undervotes – that is, 134 ballots in which voters did not select a candidate even though it was a single-race election. The winner received 12 more votes than the runner-up. Florida law requires a manual recount of invalid votes when the winning margin is less than one-quarter of one percent. However, election officials determined that no recount was required because the 134 invalid votes were cast on electronic voting machines, and there is no record of the original votes.[2]
  • May 2003: Florida. An internal review of election results by a Miami-Dade county election official found that a DRE system sold by ES&S and used in the May 20, 2003 North Miami Beach runoff election (as well as in earlier elections) was “unusable” for auditing, recounting or certifying an election due to a “serious bug” in the software.[3] As of August 2004, the newest software releases from ES&S fix this bug, which turns out to have been triggered by a low battery condition.[4] 
  • November 2002: North Carolina.  At two early-voting locations in Wake County, North Carolina (Raleigh), iVotronics failed to record 436 ballots.  This was due to a problem in the firmware of the machines.[5]  Firmware is a kind of software loaded on read-only memory so that it cannot be easily changed.
  • October 2002: Texas.  Democrats said they received several dozen complaints from people who said that they selected a Democratic candidate but that their vote appeared beside the name of a Republican on the screen. Some votes cast for Republicans were counted for Democrats.[6]
  • September 2002: Florida.  A spot check of machines revealed two problems. First, several Miami-Dade precincts, each with hundreds of voters, are listed as showing one or even no votes cast on election day. Second, differences arose within the same precincts between vote totals produced by the main tabulation system and a backup system.[7]


[1] Note that the vote data transmitted to the PEB at the closing of a machine is summary vote data instead of raw vote data; that is, it is a summary of the votes recorded rather than each individual electronic ballot as stored inside the iVotronic's internal memory.  In order to do a proper recount or error analysis, one would need to remove the CF cards from the iVotronics and seal the CF cards for a precinct with the PEB and any printouts.  This information is courtesy of Doug Jones of the University of Iowa.
[2] “Electronic Vote Recount Stumps Broward Officials.” SUN-SENTINEL, January 10, 2004.
[3] “Count Crisis? Election Officials Warn of Glitches that May Scramble Vote Auditing.” MIAMI DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW, May 16, 2004. “Glitch Forces Change in Vote Audits.” THE MIAMI HERALD, May 15, 2004.
[4] Doug Jones, personal communication.  Note that the software that fixes this bug has made it through ITA testing and state testing in at least Florida.
[5] “Electronic Ballots Fail To Win Over Wake Voters, Election Officials; Machines Provide Improper Vote Count At Two Locations,” WRAL-TV RALEIGH-DURHAM, Nov. 2, 2002.
[6] “Area Democrats say early votes miscounted,” THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 22, 2002.
[7] “Leahy: Unskilled workers to blame,” MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 12, 2002.





The Verifier Map

How do Americans cast their ballots? See the Verifier Map for detailed information on voting systems used in each state and county in recent elections.

voting equipment used in earlier elections (2004/2006)


Get E-Mail Alerts




Announcements

February 3, 2010
NJ Judge Issues Mixed Order on Use of E-voting Machines
February 1, 2010
Ruling Issued in RutgersNewark Law Schools Constitutional Litigation Clinic Challenge to NJ's Electronic Voting Machines
February 1, 2010
Holt Statement on NJ Court Decision on Paper Ballots
January 28, 2010
Internet Voting, Still in Beta
January 28, 2010
MD: State elections head says new voting system costly, not effective
January 26, 2010
Coalition Supports Improvements for Troop Voting; Rejects Risky Internet Ballot Proposals
January 21, 2010
WV: The Internet is not a secure-enough platform for overseas voters
January 15, 2010
Maryland needs secure, verifiable voting system
December 5, 2009
TN: Voters need confidence in electoral process
December 1, 2009
Election Technology Leaders Launch "The Power To MOVE"
November 12, 2009
Patrick OKs expanded benefits for veterans
November 6, 2009
Plaintiffs Comment on Court Order regarding TN Voter Confidence Act
November 4, 2009
Security expert: no way to secure Internet voting
November 3, 2009
E-voting system lets voters verify their ballots are counted
November 3, 2009
Justice Department Probing Diebold Sale
October 27, 2009
In Industry First, Voting Machine Company to Publish Source Code
October 9, 2009
TN: State Division Of Elections Hosts Meeting On Optical Scan Voting
October 6, 2009
Verified Voting Statement on the Acquisition of Premier Election Solutions
October 1, 2009
Common Cause Tennessee Takes Legal Action to Protect Voters
October 1, 2009
Advocates warn of voting-machine 'monopoly'

Important Links

  • Election Workers: Take our 2008 Election Worker Survey
  • Election Day Problems?
    Call 1-866-OUR-VOTE
  • Find Your Polling Place: Vote411.org
  • Questions? Contact Us
  • Vote Trust USA - national resource for state-based organizations supporting verifiable elections, a Verified Voting Foundation project



  • "The core of our American democracy is the right to vote. Implicit in that right is the notion that that vote be private, that vote be secure, and that vote be counted as it was intended when it was cast by the voter. And I think what we're encountering is a pivotal moment in our democracy where all of that is being called into question." (more here)

    Kevin Shelley, former
    California Sec. of State





    VerifiedVoting.org, Inc., is a 501(c)(4) nonprofit corporation.

    © Copyright 2008, VerifiedVoting.org, Inc. All rights reserved, although reprint permission granted for nonprofit purposes with attribution to VerifiedVoting.org.


    Privacy    Site Map