Post-election risk-limiting audits (RLAs) can increase voter confidence in the tabulation of election results.

**#1** Do you have voter-verified paper ballots or paper records?

**RLAs Depend on Paper Evidence**
In an RLA, auditors inspect some of the cast ballots to determine if the outcomes reported in machine-tabulated totals are supported by the paper evidence that has been verified by individual voters.

**Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machines (DREs) Provide Nothing To Audit**
Direct recording electronic voting machines (DREs) provide nothing to audit, and software-generated ballot images cannot provide trustworthy audit evidence because they can be manipulated after votes are cast.

**#2** Do you have ballot storage and handling procedures that enable reliable ballot retrieval?

**RLAs Require Reliable Storage**
Keeping reliable records of how and where ballots are stored and developing ways to find ballots by their position within a batch make it easier to retrieve specific, individual ballots randomly selected for auditing.

**Proper Storage and Handling Can Increase Audit Efficiency**
When multiple ballot styles are used, sorting and storing ballots by style can reduce the number of ballots needed to audit. Where possible and permissible by law, printing an identifier onto ballots as they are scanned can also make ballot retrieval quicker, though this is not a requirement for audits.

**#3** Are you using all the technology capability your voting machines allow?

**Cast Vote Records (CVRs) Can Help**
Many modern voting systems can produce cast vote records (CVRs) that indicate how the machine interpreted each ballot it scanned.

**CVRs Make The Audit Process More Efficient**
RLAs that use CVRs in the audit process can make the audit more efficient, allowing fewer ballots to be examined to reach an acceptable level of assurance. However, it is feasible to conduct RLAs without CVRs, often still with a relatively small number of ballots.