State Summary
After each primary election, general election and special election, counties may choose to conduct a traditional “hand count audit” or a risk-limiting audit. The “hand count” audit depends on the margin of victory: if the margin of victory is less than 1% of the total votes cast, 10% of all precincts or 10% of all batches of ballots are hand counted; if the margin is between 1% and 2%, 5% of all precincts or batches are hand counted; if the margin is 2% or greater, 3% of all precincts or batches are hand counted. Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.529(2). The audit must begin no later than the 27th day after the election. Audits of candidate contests must be completed within 35 days of the election and those of measures within 30 days of the election. Or. Admin. R. 165-007-0290(9).
Statutory requirements governing a risk-limiting audit appear in Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.532, and rules on risk-limiting audit provisions appear in Or. Admin. R.165-007-0450. If the county clerk decides to conduct a risk-limiting audit, the county clerk shall conduct a risk-limiting audit for one or more single-county election contests. For an election contest involving more than one county, the county clerk may request that the secretary of state or the county clerks in the other counties holding the election coordinate for the purpose of conducting a multi-county risk-limiting audit.
Unless otherwise specified, statutory references are to Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.529.
Voting Systems Used
Oregon uses hand-marked paper ballots and optical scanners, with ballot marking devices for accessibility. All registered voters receive a mail ballot and ballots are tabulated by batch-fed optical scanners. For the most up to date information please visit Verified Voting’s Verifier.
For an explanation on the types of voting equipment used, click here.
Audit Comprehensiveness
Oregon is a vote-by-mail state and also uses absentee ballots for military voters or for those voters out of state during an election. Provisional and absentee ballots are not specifically mentioned in the audit provisions in Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.529. However, according to the office of the Oregon secretary of state, where vote tally systems are used, these ballots are included in the audit.
The risk-limiting audit statute does specify that the audit must take into account all validly cast ballots, including provisional ballots. Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.532(4)(d).
Transparency
Members of the public may observe the audit. While candidates and sponsors of ballot measures are notified by mail of the audit, there are no provisions specifying if they are allowed appointed observers, or their ability to observe and verify ballot marks. Or. Admin. R. 165-007-0290(7)–(8). Results of the audit must be made publicly available on the secretary of state’s website. Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.529(5).
Audit Counting Method
The audit is conducted manually.
Type Of Audit Units
For hand count audits, precincts/batches are used. For risk-limiting audits, the type is not specified, but presumably individual ballots will be sampled.
Contests & Issues Audited
If a traditional hand count audit is chosen by a county clerk, the counties audits the race between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the county, an election contest for an office voted on in the state at large and, if possible, an election contest for a state measure. The secretary of state selects the precincts or batches at random. Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.529(3).
If an RLA is selected, the county clerk conducts a risk-limiting audit for one or more single-county election contests. Alternatively, the clerk may request that the secretary of state or county clerks in other counties coordinate to conduct a multi-county audit. Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.532(3).
Addressing Discrepancies
In hand count audits: If the audit of the initial sample identifies a discrepancy greater than 0.5%, the random sample is audited by hand again. If this second audit shows a discrepancy equal to or less than 0.5%, the initial tally is the official result. If the second audit still shows a discrepancy greater than 0.5%, all ballots for that vote tally system are to be audited, and the result of this final manual count is the official result. (The statute provides no mechanism for an audit of a statewide contest to expand to a full hand count beyond any counties in which such discrepancies are found.) Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.529(7).
In a risk-limiting audit, discrepancies may cause an audit to expand until the risk limit is attained, or to a full hand count if necessary. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.532(1).
For recount laws, please visit our Recount Law Database.
Timeline
The hand count must begin no later than the 27th day after the election. All hand counts for measures must be completed no later than the 30th day after the election and those for candidate contests by the 35th day after the election. Or. Admin. R. 165-007-0290(9). However, the random selection is to be conducted no later than 5 p.m. on the 15th business day after election day. Or. Admin. R. 165-007-0290(5). In addition, the manual audit cannot begin until after certification of the initial election results (which does not preclude altering the results). Or. Admin. R. 165-007-0290(9).
Binding On Official Outcomes
In hand count audits, if a third hand count is conducted for the audit, the results of the audit are the official results of the election. Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.529(7)(d). (However, the audit cannot directly trigger a statewide hand count.) Risk-limiting audits are implied (but not explicitly stated) to be binding on outcomes. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.532(4)(d).
Oversight & Conduct
The secretary of state oversees the audit and conducts the random selection, while county clerks conduct the audit.
Ballot Protection
County officials are responsible for the security of all ballots. As soon as practicable after the final day permitted for a contest of the election or for filing a demand for a recount, the county clerk shall destroy all unused ballots. Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.483.
County officials are also required to submit a county elections security plan to the secretary of state each year that includes security procedures for ballots at the printer, in storage, during transport, and at drop sites as well as voted ballots awaiting verification, voted ballots opened and inspected, etc. and post-election security. Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.074; see also Or. Admin. R. 165-007-0310.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.529(8) also specifies that for the audit the county clerk must retain custody of the ballots and provide for security for the ballots and the information required to be collected for the audit.
Additional Targeted Samples
Statute does not provide for targeted samples. However, Or. Admin. R. 165-007-0270 allows county elections officials to choose to conduct an administrative recount of a selected office or measure by hand to verify the accuracy of the vote tally equipment. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 246.150.
Resources
Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.529 and Or. Admin. R. 165-007-0290: Hand count audit provisions
Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.532 and Or. Admin. R.165-007-0450: Risk-limiting audit provisions
Or. Admin. R. 165-007-0270: Administrative recount
Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.483; Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.074; and Or. Admin. R. 165-007-0310: Ballot protection
Last updated: October 30, 2024