texas

TexasAudit Laws

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State Summary

The Texas audit law was originally passed in 1987 and has since been amended several times, including in 2025. Additional guidance regarding audits from the Texas Secretary of State is made in Election Advisory No. 2025-21, Election Advisory No. 2025-22, and the Post-Election Hand Count Audit Guide (Nov. 2025).

Audits in Texas include at least 1% of election day polling locations and 1% of early voting locations or in three election day polling locations and three early voting locations, whichever is greater, in each county. A similar requirement exists for mail ballots: an audit is conducted of at least 1% of precincts in which a mail ballot was cast and counted using automatic tabulating equipment or at least three precincts, whichever is greater. All items on the ballot are audited, except in certain elections: general elections for state and county officers, primary elections, or any election with proposed state constitutional amendments or statewide ballot measures. In these elections, the secretary of state selects up to three contests and up to three ballot items. Tex. Elec. Code § 127.201(a)–(b). The audit is not binding on the results.

In 2021, the state legislature passed S.B. 598, which established a risk-limiting audit (RLA) pilot program beginning with the election taking place November 8, 2022 (and requiring a paper audit trail for voting machines). The secretary of state is required to select at least five counties to participate in the pilot program.  At least one county participating in the pilot program must have a population of at least 500,000. Under the law, risk-limiting audits must be implemented statewide after August 31, 2026 for elections containing a race or measure that is voted on statewide. Tex. Elec. Code § 127.301. Counties participating in RLA pilots will also be required to complete current audit provisions as well.

Unless otherwise specified, statutory references are to Tex. Elec. Code § 127.201. References herein describe the current audit practice and not RLAs, as the RLA provisions are still in pilot form.

Voting Systems Used

Most Texas counties use ballot marking devices (BMDs) and optical scanners for all voters. Others use hand-marked paper ballots, with either BMDs or direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines without VVPAT for accessibility or curbside voting. As of 2025, only one county uses DRE voting machines without VVPAT for all voters; however, as required by 2021’s S.B. 598, all counties are required to replace these with equipment that produces a paper ballot or record by 2026. For the most up to date information please visit Verified Voting’s Verifier.

For an explanation on the types of voting equipment used, click here

Audit Comprehensiveness

The audit is only conducted in voting locations using electronic voting systems with auditable paper ballots or records. See Tex. Elec. Code § 127.201(g). As of 2025, the vast majority of election jurisdictions in Texas use ballot marking devices—which mark a paper ballot for the voter—either for all voters or as accessibility devices used in conjunction with hand-marked paper ballots. However, one county continues to use direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines without voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) printers for all voters, and a few other counties use DREs without VVPAT printers for accessibility or curbside voting. A 2025 election advisory provided greater clarity on which ballots are included as part of the “post-election hand count.” While ballots cast on DREs and hand counted ballots are exempt from audit, the following ballots are included: early voting in person ballots, early voting by mail ballots, and Election Day ballots. Tex. Elec. Code § 127.201(g); see also Election Advisory No. 2025-21 and Post-Election Hand Count Audit Guide (p. 1).

The 2025 revisions to the audit statute require auditing of election day polling locations, early voting locations, and mail ballots.  Both the secretary of state and general custodian of election records may direct additional auditing. Tex. Elec. Code §§ 127.201(b-3), 127.202(a).

Note that according to Tex. Elec. Code § 127.302(a-1), all counties must participate in a risk-limiting audit, “regardless of the method of counting voted ballots used by the county.”

Transparency

While candidates and their appointed representatives are allowed to observe the audit, there are no provisions that mention their ability to verify ballot marks. Tex. Elec. Code § 127.201(d). While appointed observers are allowed, there is also no mention of the general public’s ability to attend, and no requirement for the time and location of the audit to be publicly announced. 

Counties must publish the results of the hand count audit on the county website. Tex. Elec. Code § 127.201(e)(2).

Audit Counting Method

The audit statute specifies a manual count. Tex. Elec. Code § 127.201(a).

Type Of Audit Units

The hand count audit treats precincts/polling locations or early voting locations as the audit unit. Election Advisory No. 2025-21 allows counties optionally to audit all of their early voting by mail ballots, instead of only counting mail ballots for the selected precincts.

Contests & Issues Audited

Two statutory provisions address which contests are to be audited. The first, more general, provision requires that the general custodian of election records (generally, the county clerk, though in local elections conducting their own elections, it would refer to a local official) conduct an audit for all items on the ballot in the polling locations and precincts randomly selected by the custodian. However, for certain elections— general elections for state and county officers, primary elections, or any election with proposed state constitutional amendments or statewide ballot measures— the secretary of state selects “not more than three” contests and “not more than three” ballot items to be audited. Tex. Elec. Code § 127.201(b). The secretary of state also randomly selects the polling locations and precincts for audits of these elections.

Addressing Discrepancies

The audit statute itself does not provide guidance on discrepancies that occur during the audit. Election Advisory No. 2012-03 from 2012 states that in the case of a discrepancy, an election official should continue the audit until the cause of the discrepancy was determined. The more recent Election Advisory No. 2025-21 requires that as part of a report on the audit election officials should explain any discrepancies and their efforts to resolve them. The Post-Election Hand Count Audit Guide (p. 19-20) details the process for investigating discrepancies found in the audit.

For recount laws, please visit our Recount Law Database.

Timeline

The audit must begin within 72 hours after the polls close, and be completed not later than the 21st day after Election Day. However, in an election in which a statewide RLA is performed, the hand count audit instead begins no later than the first business day after the RLA is complete and must be completed no later than the 30th day after election day or a deadline designated by the secretary of state, whichever is later. Since Texas does not yet conduct RLAs statewide, we consider the hand count audit to take place prior to certification. 

Note that Tex. Elec. Code § 127.302 was revised in 2025 to no longer require RLAs to be conducted prior to certification and allows the secretary of state to determine the deadline for the RLA’s completion.

Regarding optional audits by the secretary of state (see “Additional Targeted Samples”): “The count may be conducted at any time during the period for preserving the applicable precinct election records.” Tex. Elec. Code § 127.202(b).

Binding On Official Outcomes

The statute does not stipulate whether the results are binding upon the official election results. See also “Addressing Discrepancies.”

Oversight & Conduct

The secretary of state oversees the audit, while the audit is conducted by the general custodian of election records (generally, the county elections official). Depending on the type of election, the precincts for audit are selected by the custodian or the secretary of state.

Ballot Protection

Ballot boxes must have a lock and key. When processing electronic voting system results, only the tabulation supervisor and their assistants may handle the ballots or operate the tabulation equipment. Tex. Elec. Code § 51.034; see also Tex. Elec. Code. § 127.127.

For the purposes of the audit, the general custodian of election records is authorized to access the ballot box or container containing election records. The records must be re-secured following the audit, and the general custodian of election records must track the chain of custody of ballot boxes, and document the breaking of any tamper evident seals used on ballot boxes. See Election Advisory No. 2025-21 and Post-Election Hand Count Audit Guide. The records must be resecured following the audit, and the general custodian of election records must track chain of custody of ballot boxes, and document the breaking of any tamper evident seals used on ballot boxes. See Election Advisory No. 2018-30.

Additional Targeted Samples

The secretary of state may select additional ballots for audit: “any portion of any number of ballots from any precinct in which the electronic voting system was used” for auditing at their discretion. Tex. Elec. Code § 127.202(a).

Similarly, the general custodian of election records may select additional precincts and polling places to be audited. Tex. Elec. Code § 127.201(b-3).

Resources

Tex. Elec. Code § 127.201: Audit statute
Tex. Elec. Code § 127.202: Additional ballot audit statute
Tex. Elec. Code § 127.301: Risk-limiting audit statute
Election Advisory Nos. 2025-21 and 2025-22: Hand count audit advisories
Post-Election Hand Count Audit Guide (Nov. 2025)
Election Advisory No. 2012-03: Electronic voting system procedures

 

Last updated: December 19, 2025

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