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April 8, 2025 

The Honorable Francisco V. Aguilar 

Secretary of State  

Nevada State Capitol Building  

101 North Carson Street, Suite 3  

Carson City, NV 89701 

 

Dear Secretary Aguilar,  

As organizations committed to protecting and enhancing our democracy, we write  regarding our concerns with a specific aspect of Nevada’s Effective Absentee  System for Elections (EASE).[1] We have previously sought opportunities to discuss  our concerns, and hope that you may be able to find time to speak with us soon.  

As currently used, EASE allows voters covered by the Uniformed and Overseas  Absentee Citizens Voting Act (UOCAVA),[2] voters with disabilities, and voters  who are tribal members who reside on a reservation, to return their ballots over the  internet.[3] Electronic ballot return poses an inherently high security risk to Nevada’s elections and is improper under the Department of Defense grant terms that  governed the development and use of EASE. 

We hope that, by sharing the below information and raising these concerns, we  may illuminate these serious issues so that your administration will seek alternative  absentee voting solutions that do not put these voters’ ballots, and Nevada’s  elections, at risk. Especially as our democratic republic is being actively undermined at the federal level, it’s important our elections remain above question. We welcome the opportunity to work together with your office on these solutions.  

1 | EASE is a “High” Security Risk for Nevada Elections. 

Four federal government agencies—the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the  Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency  (CISA), the U.S. Elections Assistance Commission (EAC) and the National  Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST)—have concluded in a risk  assessment that “electronic ballot return” is “high” risk, even with security  safeguards and cyber precautions in place.[4] In other words, even with all the  security tools and protections deployed with EASE, these ballots are still at high  risk for compromise. The agencies specifically warn that electronic ballot return “faces significant security risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of  voted ballots,” and that these risks can “ultimately affect the tabulation and  results and can occur at scale,” and explicitly recommends paper ballot return.[5] 

Thus, the ballots of Nevadan UOCAVA voters, voters with disabilities, and voters  who are tribal members who reside on a reservation, who use EASE to return their  ballots over the internet, and Nevada’s elections themselves, incur high risk for  cyber incidents, privacy violations, ballot deletion, or election tampering. Especially at a time when the integrity and veracity of election results are  continuously called into question, it is not prudent to ignore the significant security  warning issued by the four federal government agencies charged with protecting  our nation’s election infrastructure. 

Beyond the four-agency report, there is broad consensus, from both the public and  private sector, that electronic ballot return presents severe security risks to the  integrity of our elections, because ballots cast over the internet can be intercepted, deleted and altered at scale—and can therefore change election results. 

  • In 2019, the bipartisan U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported on its findings that foreign governments were actively trying to  attack American election systems. As part of that report, the Committee  determined “States should resist pushes for online voting. …While the  Committee agrees states should take great pains to ensure members of the  military get to vote for their elected officials, no system of online voting has  yet established itself as secure.”[6]
  • In late 2022, experts convened by the University of California’s Berkeley  Center for Security in Policy concluded that creating standards for online  ballot return so that it can be done securely and privately was not feasible. “When internet ballot return is employed,” the Working Group wrote, “it  may be possible for a single attacker to alter thousands or even millions  of votes. And this lone individual could perpetrate an attack from a different  continent from the one where the election is being held – perhaps even while  under the protection of a rogue nation where there is no concern of  repercussions.”[7]
  • Following up on the four-agency report, NIST (the federal agency  responsible for issuing cybersecurity standards) conducted research on ways  to enhance accessibility for voters with disabilities. Its 2022 report,  Promoting Access to Voting, notably did not recommend electronic ballot  return, instead concluding, “there remain significant security, privacy, and  ballot secrecy challenges.”[8]

2 | Because of the severe and well-documented security risks inherent with online ballot return, the federal grant used to develop EASE explicitly

Starting in 2000, the federal government invested considerable time and resources  in studying the security issues introduced by the electronic return of voted ballots.  The research was conducted with the aim of developing security standards for an  electronic ballot return system for military and overseas voters.[9] After decades of  research and multiple studies determined that there were numerous, insoluble  security issues,[10] Congress then repealed a directive to the Department of Defense  to develop an electronic ballot return system in 2015.[11] 

As this research was being conducted, Congress authorized funding for grants to be  distributed by the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) to states to improve  voting for UOCAVA voters through the EASE Grant programs. According to the  FVAP.gov website: 

In 2011, 2013, and again in 2023, FVAP offered research grants to states  and localities to research improving services provided to military and  overseas voters. The Effective Absentee Systems for Elections (EASE)  grants have the goal of increasing the percentage of ballots successfully  returned by voters covered by the FVAP administered Uniformed and  Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). The resulting data  from the grant programs will help to identify and improve the true nature of  the entire voting experience for military and overseas voters.[12] 

The FVAP’s description of the EASE grants includes this specific qualification: 

“Please note the electronic transmission of voted ballots is not funded  through these grant programs.”[13] 

Congress and the FVAP recognized that we do not yet have the tools to transmit  voted ballots securely over the internet, and specifically prohibited using any  federal funds for that purpose.  

  1. Nevada’s EASE System was developed with an FVAP EASE 2 grant, which  explicitly prohibits using the funds to develop a system or components that  return voted ballots electronically for the life of the system or components.  

Nevada first developed its EASE system with a grant from the Department of  Defense’s FVAP and no additional funding. According to the EASE Overview  published on the Nevada Secretary of State website: “Without any additional state  funding, the Secretary of State’s office developed the system with a grant from the  Department of Defense’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), which was  used to design and develop an application that allows military and overseas voters  to access their blank absentee ballot online beginning with the 2014 general  election.”[14] In 2013, Nevada received an EASE 2 grant from the FVAP for  $386,500.00 to develop a “uniform statewide UOCAVA ballot delivery system.”  According to the state’s proposal, EASE would “seamlessly integrate[] all parts of  the UOCAVA process (voter registration, ballot request, and online ballot  marking) into a single online system.”[15] Notably, the proposal included nothing  about electronic ballot return. 

The EASE grant terms and contracts expressly prohibit using the grant funds for a  system or components of a system that return ballots electronically, even after the  grant term expires. FVAP emphasized this prohibition through multiple channels.  Both the Broad Agency Announcement published by the FVAP and the grant  

contract issued to all recipients (including Nevada) included these terms:  

The grant awards will not fund the electronic return of a voted ballot.  Applicants will certify prior to award that they will not use any grant funds  to develop a system for the electronic return of a marked ballot. Further  applicants will certify that they will not use the system components  developed with grant funds, after the award ends, for the electronic return of  voted ballots.[16] 

The FVAP further clarified this restriction in its EASE 2.0 Questions and Answers  regarding the grant:  

Grant Recipients are prohibited from using the system or portion of the  system developed with grant funds for the electronic return of a marked  ballot for the life of the components developed with the grant funds.[17]

Although the grant terms and contract explicitly prohibited the electronic return of  voted ballots, on November 20, 2013, then-Secretary of State Ross Miller gave  testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on House  Administration, and admitted that the system Nevada built with its grant would  return the voted ballot electronically to the election office.[18] 

To illustrate how seriously the Department of Defense sought to enforce the grant  terms, the Department launched an Inspector General investigation into the use of  the FVAP grants in Nevada, prompted by Secretary Miller’s testimony. The  investigators visited Nevada and were given a demonstration of Nevada’s EASE  system by the Secretary of State’s office.  

The investigators reported that the system demonstrated by the Secretary of State’s  office allowed the voter to save a marked, electronic ballot to the voter’s computer  that could then be returned as an email attachment. Because the system, as it was  demonstrated, did not itself transmit the voted ballot back, the Inspector General’s  office concluded that Nevada did not violate the terms of the FVAP grants.[19] 

Subsequently, the Secretary of State’s office put a disclaimer on its website that  stated, “User must return their completed documents and ballot to their Nevada  election office independent of EASE – EASE does not return any documents for a  user.”[20] 

However, according to a March 26, 2023 email sent by the Nevada State Election  Director, Mark Wlaschin, “EASE offers a means for direct submission [of a voted  ballot] (where it goes directly on the SOS server and then is available for the  Clerk), but it is not required and they can print & mail it back on their own as  well.”[21] If the election director’s description is accurate, Nevada is violating the  terms of the EASE 2 grant awarded to Nevada by the FVAP, which prohibits states  from using any component of a system built with federal funds, for the life of the  components, to electronically return voted ballots.  

We note that as of April 7, 2025, the website no longer states that the voter is  required to return the ballot through means other than EASE. 

3 | Conclusion 

EASE should not be used by Nevadans to undertake electronic ballot return. According to the FBI, Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and  Infrastructure Security Agency, National Institute of Standards and Technology  and U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Nevada’s EASE system is at “high  risk” for cyber attacks that can compromise ballot integrity, security and  availability that may affect tabulation and election results, and may occur at scale.  

Further, if Nevada’s EASE system operates as it has been described by the state  election director, by directly transmitting voted ballots to the Secretary’s server for  distribution to the clerk’s offices, it violates the federal grant contract and terms for  the grant Nevada was awarded for the development of EASE in 2014.  

We hope that this information will prompt your administration to seek alternative  voting solutions for eligible voters that do not put their ballots, and Nevada’s  elections, at risk—and that may not violate federal contract terms. We welcome the  opportunity to work together with your office on these solutions. 

Thank you very much for your time and consideration.

  

Sincerely,  

Susan Greenhalgh
Senior Advisor on Election Security
Free Speech for People

Aquene Freechild 
Co-Director, Democracy Campaign
Public Citizen 

Megan Maier 
Deputy Director of Research & Partnerships
Verified Voting

  1. 1 Please note that both the electronic balloting system in use in Nevada, and the federal grants  referenced in this letter are referred to by the acronym “EASE,” though both stand for different  terms. “EASE,” the system used in Nevada stands for “Effective Absentee System for Elections.”  “EASE” grants stands for “Electronic Absentee System for Elections.” We regret the inevitable  confusion this may cause. 
  2. 2 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301–20311, 39  U.S.C. § 3406, 10 U.S.C. § 1566, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 608–609. 
  3. 3 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.269951(1)(b).
  4. U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National  Institute of Standards and Technology and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Risk  Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return 1 (2020), available at  https://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/Final_%20Risk_Management_for_Electronic Ballot_05082020.pdf?mod=article_inline.
  5. Id.
  6. Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate on Russian Active Measures  Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 1 (2019),https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume1.pdf
  7. R. Michael Alvarez et al., University of California, Berkeley Center for Security in Politics,  Working Group Statement on Developing Standards for Internet Ballot Return 10 (2022),  https://csp.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Working-Group-Statement-on-Internet-Ballot Return.pdf.
  8.  National Institute of Standards and Technology, Promoting Access to Voting: Recommendations for  Addressing Barriers to Private and Independent Voting for People with Disabilities 48 (2022),  https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.1273.pdf.
  9. 9 See generally Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), Electronic Voting Demo Project (2017),  https://www.fvap.gov/info/reports-surveys/evdp-report.
  10. 10 See National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), NIST Activities on UOCAVA Voting,  (May 12, 2012, updated, January 4, 2023),. https://www.nist.gov/itl/voting/uocava-voting.
  11. 11 See Congressional Research Service, The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act:  Overview and Issues, 11 (October 26, 2016), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS20764.
  12. Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), Grant Programs, https://www.fvap.gov/eo/grants (last  visited Mar. 6, 2025).
  13. Id.
  14. 14 Nevada Secretary of State, EASE – Overview, https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/elections/voters/uniformed-overseas-citizens/ease-overview (last  visitedMar. 5, 2025).
  15. 15 Office of the Nevada Secretary of State Ross Miller, Nevada Effective Absentee System for Elections  Technical Proposal 2 (2014),,https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Grants/Nevada_application_2.pdf.
  16. 16 Federal Voting Assistance Program, Broad Agency Announcement For States, Territories and Local  Governments Effective Absentee Systems for Elections (EASE) 2.0 Grants 4, https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Grants/EASE%202_BAA.pdf; see also Federal Voting Assistance Program, Grant Award (“Terms and Conditions”) (2013), https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Grants/Nevada_H98210-13-1-0006.pdf.
  17. 17 Federal Voting Assistance Program, EASE 2.0 Questions and Answers, https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Grants/EASE%202%20Question%20and%20Answers.pdf
  18. 18 See Military and Overseas Voting in 2012: Hearing Before the Comm. on House Administration,  113 Cong. 57–58 (2013) (Statement of Ross Miller), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG 113hhrg86539/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg86539.pdf.
  19. 19 “Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense, Assessment of the Effective Absentee System for  Elections (EASE) Grants 8–9 (2015), https://media.defense.gov/2015/Jun/30/2001713517/-1/- 1/1/DODIG-2015-135.pdf.
  20. 20 https://web.archive.org/web/20161125054253/http://nvsos.gov/sos/elections/voters/uniformed overseas-citizens
  21. 21 Email from Nevada Election Director Mark Wlaschin to Susan Greenhalgh, Free Speech For  People (March 26, 2023).
Category: Letter