Author: J. Alex Halderman This article was posted at Ed Felten’s “Freedom to Tinker” blog and is re-posted with permission. The District of Columbia is conducting a pilot project to allow overseas and military voters to download and return absentee ballots over the Internet. Before opening the system to real voters, D.C. has been holding…
This week, as University of Michigan computer technologists revealed in stark fashion the risks of Internet voting, Verified Voting, Common Cause, and Voter Action worked to halt an effort to expand the electronic return of voted ballots in Washington State. The Secretary of State of Washington has proposed an emergency rule that would allow voters…
Author: David Jefferson University of Michigan Prof. Alex Halderman has now released some details about his successful attack on the District of Columbia’s proposed Internet voting system which has been under test for the last week. (See www.freedom-to-tinker.com.) It is now clear that Halderman and his team were able to completely subvert the entire DC…
Verified Voting applauds the decision of the District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics to suspend their plan to offer overseas voters the dangerous option of returning their voted ballots by a “digital vote by mail” Internet voting system. The District’s plans to continue other Internet-based ballot return methods (including email and fax) for…
On September 29th Senator Joseph Addabbo, chair of the Senate Elections Committee held a hearing on the recent New York State primary when new paper ballot and optical scan systems were used statewide for the first time. The hearing focused on reported problems that occurred in New York City, the largest election jurisdiction in the country with…
Author: Bo Lipari Despite the impressions received from media reports, the September 14th primary was not the first time that New Yorkers voted on paper ballots and scanners. In the 2009 off-year election, 47 counties in upstate New York used the new systems as part of a pilot program. This trial run taught participants valuable…
If we can use the Internet to deliver blank ballots, then why not use it to return voted ballots? Part of the answer lies with the nature of the Internet itself. If we are to be sure that the vote cast is the same as the vote counted, we need a way to guarantee that 1)…
Last week, the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) adopted a resolution acknowledging both serious security and privacy concerns related to Internet voting and the need for a verifiable, recountable election process. Verified Voting applauds NASS for adopting this official position. Military and overseas voters (also called “UOCAVA voters” after the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting…
Author: Pamela Smith Given the current focus on UOCAVA implementation, the NIST draft Information System Security Best Practices for UOCAVA-Supporting Systems (referred to here as the Draft) is a timely and important document. A summary of security standards and guidelines “deemed most applicable for jurisdictions using IT systems to support UOCAVA voting” is indeed necessary at a…
Last week’s surprising outcome in a party primary in South Carolina for United States Senate was accompanied by anecdotal reports of voting problems on election day, and many questions about the accuracy of the vote count. Whether specific reports of irregularities in this election are confirmed, the most important fact about South Carolina’s voting system…