Guidance by Common Cause and Verified Voting outlines that remote accessible vote by mail options that keep voters choices private and secure already exist and should be made available to voters with disabilities as states increase access to vote by mail.
The COVID-19 epidemic has impacted many aspects of American democracy. Primaries have been rescheduled, processes for absentee ballots changed, and polling sites relocated, often with less than 24 hours’ notice. Throughout it all, election officials have been and will continue to be essential workers on the front line of protecting our democracy amidst this pandemic. People have risked their lives to ensure that others can cast their ballots. Given Verified Voting’s mission, these recommendations center on election security and verification, but they can only be implemented if election officials are safe and supported.
Answers to frequently asked questions specifically on RLAs. Defines what “risk” signifies in an RLA and details different RLA methods.
Our guide describing three RLA methods: ballot-level comparison, batch comparison, and ballot polling. This chart was developed by Verified Voting in consultation with Lynn Garland, Independent Advisor, and with the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law.
The following is a policy statement issued by the staff of Verified Voting Foundation on the use of Direct Recording Electronic voting systems and Ballot Marking Devices. Ahead of the 2020 presidential election, the U.S. finds itself again in the position of widespread deployment of a relatively newer voting technology — ballot marking devices (“BMDs”). Because devices vary widely, Verified Voting is explicitly stating our current views on evaluation, ongoing development and best practice deployment of this technology.
A guide comparing the features of ballot marking devices (BMDs) available in the United States. The guide is intended to be a useful comparison chart between the various BMD vendors and devices for informational purposes. Verified Voting does not endorse any specific vendor or device.
Now, state law requires Rhode Island election officials to conduct risk-limiting audits, the “gold standard” of post-election audits, beginning with the 2020 primary. A risk-limiting audit (“RLA”) is an innovative, efficient tool to test the accuracy of election outcomes. Instead of auditing a predetermined number of ballots, officials conducting an RLA audit enough ballots to find strong statistical evidence that outcomes are correct. The law, enacted in the aftermath of two critical events relating to the 2016 elections, stems from decades of advocacy aimed at increasing the efficiency, transparency, and verifiability of political contests in the state. Rhode Island is now the second state, joining trailblazing Colorado, to mandate use of this modern tool statewide.
Experts agree that risk-limiting audits, or RLAs, are the best method for providing evidence-based reassurance that an election outcome is accurate, or identifying when an anomaly requires further investigation. Despite this consensus, only two states currently have statutory requirements for true RLAs. Verified Voting and our RLA Pilots want to change that.
Chair Lofgren, Ranking Member Davis and members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to submit testimony to the Committee on House Administration hearing on “Election Security.” We urge the Committee to move expeditiously to support state and local jurisdictions in strengthening their election systems and provide upfront and sustained investment in election infrastructure and security. Since 2016, it is clear that the threat to our democratic institution of voting is not theoretical, but real and persistent. We must, as a nation, adopt the clear solutions that will allow us to defuse the destructive narrative of election hacking that undermines the very fabric of our democracy.
A healthy democracy requires widespread trust in elections. In particular, people need to be sure that the official election outcomes match the will of the voters. Election audits that examine voted ballots provide direct evidence that the people who take office and the ballot measures enacted were in fact chosen by the voters. Audits differ from recounts. Audits routinely check voting system performance in contests regardless of how close margins of victory appear to be. Recounts repeat ballot counting in special circumstances, such as when preliminary results show a close margin of victory. In most cases, audits require checking a small fraction of ballots, while a recount requires checking all ballots. Ideally, a post-election audit can lead to a full recount if necessary to correct the reported outcome.