Experts agree that risk-limiting audits, or RLAs, are the best method for providing evidence-based reassurance that an election outcome is accurate, or identifying when an anomaly requires further investigation. Despite this consensus, only two states currently have statutory requirements for true RLAs. Verified Voting and our RLA Pilots want to change that.
Chair Lofgren, Ranking Member Davis and members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to submit testimony to the Committee on House Administration hearing on “Election Security.” We urge the Committee to move expeditiously to support state and local jurisdictions in strengthening their election systems and provide upfront and sustained investment in election infrastructure and security. Since 2016, it is clear that the threat to our democratic institution of voting is not theoretical, but real and persistent. We must, as a nation, adopt the clear solutions that will allow us to defuse the destructive narrative of election hacking that undermines the very fabric of our democracy.
A healthy democracy requires widespread trust in elections. In particular, people need to be sure that the official election outcomes match the will of the voters. Election audits that examine voted ballots provide direct evidence that the people who take office and the ballot measures enacted were in fact chosen by the voters. Audits differ from recounts. Audits routinely check voting system performance in contests regardless of how close margins of victory appear to be. Recounts repeat ballot counting in special circumstances, such as when preliminary results show a close margin of victory. In most cases, audits require checking a small fraction of ballots, while a recount requires checking all ballots. Ideally, a post-election audit can lead to a full recount if necessary to correct the reported outcome.
Report on the RLA pilot conducted in the City of Fairfax, Virginia, the state’s first RLA pilot.
Report on the RLA pilot conducted in the City of Fairfax, Virginia, the state’s first RLA pilot.
A guide for public oversight of tabulation audits.
Verified Voting’s handy flowchart for conducting Risk-Limiting Audits.
Any new voting system should conform to several principles: 1. It should use human-readable marks on paper as the official record of voter preferences and as the official medium to store votes. 2. It should be accessible to voters with disabilities, and in all mandated languages.
{!{types field=’publication-type’}!}{!{/types}!} {!{types field=’publication-title’}!}{!{/types}!} Date: {!{types field=’publication-date’}!}{!{/types}!} Author: {!{types field=’publication-authors’}!}{!{/types}!} Issue: {!{types field=’publication-issue’ separator=’, ‘}!}{!{/types}!} by David Jefferson, Computer Scientist, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 1, member, Verified Voting Foundation Board, Board of Directors, California Voter Foundation There is widespread pressure around the country today for the introduction of some form of Internet voting in public elections that would allow…