March 11, 2025
Committee on Government Operations & Military Affairs
Vermont House of Representatives
115 State Street
Montpelier, VT 05633-5301
via email
Dear Chair Birong and Committee Members,
On behalf of Verified Voting, I write in opposition to the electronic ballot return provisions included in the miscellaneous elections bill 25-0242. Since our founding in 2004 by a group of computer scientists, we have advocated for policies that promote the responsible use of technology in elections. Electronic ballot return fails to meet the standard of responsible use. The Vermont Secretary of State’s Office has opposed the bill’s electronic ballot return provisions on this basis, noting that they “Oppose [electronic ballot return] until we have full confidence in security.”[1]
Four federal government agencies have concluded in a risk assessment that electronic ballot return is “High” risk, even with security safeguards and cyber precautions in place. The agencies warn that electronic ballot return “faces significant security risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of voted ballots,” and that these risks can “ultimately affect the tabulation and results and can occur at scale,” and explicitly recommend paper ballots.[2] The risk assessment was issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the U.S. Elections Assistance Commission (EAC) and the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST).
In its 2018 consensus report, Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine stated bluntly: “At the present time, the Internet (or any network connected to the Internet) should not be used for the return of marked ballots. Further, Internet voting should not be used in the future until and unless very robust guarantees of security and verifiability are developed and in place, as no known technology guarantees the secrecy, security, and verifiability of a marked ballot transmitted over the Internet.”[3]
NIST, the federal agency responsible for issuing cybersecurity standards, conducted research on ways to enhance accessibility for voters with disabilities. In its 2022 report, Promoting Access to Voting, NIST did not recommend electronic ballot return, instead concluding, “there remain significant security, privacy, and ballot secrecy challenges.”[4]
In late 2022, a blue ribbon panel convened by the University of California, Berkeley’s Center for Security in Politics concluded that creating standards for online ballot return, so that it can be done securely and privately, was not feasible. “When internet ballot return is employed,” the Working Group wrote, “it may be possible for a single attacker to alter thousands or even millions of votes. And this lone individual could perpetrate an attack from a different continent from the one where the election is being held—perhaps even while under the protection of a rogue nation where there is no concern of repercussions.”[5]
Verified Voting published a report in 2023, Casting Votes Safely: Examining Internet Voting’s Dangers and Highlighting Safer Alternatives,6that explores several alternatives to electronic ballot return are explored. Some of these include: Remote Accessible Vote-by-Mail (RAVBM), bringing voting devices directly to voters, ensuring accessible equipment is available and functioning, making improvements to ballot marking device design and deployment, providing transportation to voting locations, and extending deadlines to receive vote-by-mail ballots.
At a time when election security and public confidence are under relentless attack, Vermont should not rely on insecure technology for voters that produces unprovable election results. We urge you to remove the electronic ballot return provisions from 25-0242 and reject any other proposal that includes electronic return of voted ballots.
Respectfully submitted,
C.Jay Coles
Deputy Director of Legislative Affairs